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RECENT CASE NOTES
A.mIRALTY-MARTIME LIENS--No LlmN ATTACHES WHERE SupPrIEs ARE
FURmSHED TO OWNER OF FI.Emr.-The libellant company sold coal to a corpora-
tion owning a fleet of vessels and delivered it at the corporation's bins, from
which it was taken from time to time to supply the vessels and also the corpora-
tion's factories. The understanding was that the law would afford a lien on the
vessels for the purchase price of the coal. Thereafter the coal company libelled
twelve of the steamers, asserting maritime liens for the value of either all
the coal or of such parts of it as had been used by the libelled vessels respectively.
H-eld, that there was no maritime lien, as the coal was not furnished to the
vessels by the libellant but by the fleet owner. Piedmont & George's Creek
Coal Co. v. Seaboard Fisheries Co. (192, U. S.) 41 Sup. Ct. I.
The principal element in a maritime lien on another's property is the creditor's
power to cause the thing to be sold in order to have the debt paid out of the
price. See 2 Jones, Liens (3d ed. 1914) 922; NOTES (1915) 15 CoL. L. REv. 343.
There has been confusion in the law as to when a materialman could enforce
such a lien for repairs, supplies, or necessaries furnished to a vessel. Fitz-Henry
Smith, Jr., The Confusion in the Law Relating to Materialmen's Liens on Vessels
(igo8) 21 HARV. L. REV. 332. Congress cleared away much of this confusion
and overcame the evil results of several early decisions by statute in 1910.
36 U. S. Stat. at L. 604, U. S. Comp. St. 1916, secs. 7783-7787. This act does
not define what is meant by "furnishing repairs, etc. . . . to a vessel." See
Fitz-Henry Smith Jr., New Federal Statute Relating to Liens on Vessels (1911)
24 HARv. L Ra. 182, 2oo. The better view appears to be that a lien does not
attach "unless the goods are actually put on board the ship, or else are brought
within the immediate presence or control" of the master. The Vigilancia (1893,
S. D. N. Y.) 58 Fed. 698; The Geisha (1912, D. D, Mass.) 2oo Fed. 865. The
mere fact that the delivery is made under a contract with the owner for supplying
a fleet of vessels does not in itself prevent the acquiring of a maritime lien
if the preceding requirement is met. In such cases, however, the lien does not
operate against the fleet as a whole, but only against the separate vessels to the
extent to which each has been served. Astor Trust Co. v. White (1917, C. C. A.
4th) 241 Fed. 57, L. R. A. 1917 E, 526, note; The Alligator (3198, C. C. A. 3d) 161
Fed. 37; Hughes, Admiralty (2d ed. 192o) io6. This requirement may be
met by forwarding the supplies to a place indicated for the vessel by the order
of one in authority. The Yankee (1916, C. C. A. 3d) 233 Fed. gig. If the
supplies are furnished to the owner, the fact that they are subsequently used on
his vessels will not of itself create a lien. This arises, if at all, at the time the
supplies were furnished by the libellant and not from what .may have happened
subsequently. The Cora P. White (1917, D. D, N. J.) 243 Fed. 246. The
decision in the principal case expresses very clearly, with abundant citations,
what appears to be the generally accepted view.
ARMY AND NAvY-JURISDICTION OF COURTS-MARTIAL-CoNTITUTIONALITY OF
SECOND ARTIcLE OF WAR-END OF WA.-The petitioners had been sentenced to
dishonorable discharge from the army and to confinement in the United States
Disciplinary Barracks. After execution of the dishonorable discharge and
while -in confinement, they were, on November 4, Igi8, placed on trial before a
general court-martial, charged with murder. On November 25, 19ig, they were
found guilty, after which they were sentenced to imprisonment in the United
States penitentiary. They sought release on habeas corpus, contending that the
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court-martial had no jurisdiction to try them on a charge of murder, because
they were not at the time of the offense or of the trial members of the land
or naval forces and because the trial occurred in time of peace. Held, that the
district court correctly dismissed the petition. Kahn v. Anderson (Jan. 31,
i921) U. S. Sup. Ct Oct. Term, 192o, No. 421.
The enactment which authorized the establishment of the military prisons at
Rock Island and Fort Leavenworth made all persons confined therein amenable
to trial by courts-martial, under the rules and articles of war, for offenses com-
mitted during confinement. U. S. Rev. St. sec. 1361. The Act of June i8, 1898,
provided that soldiers sentenced to dishonorable discharge and corifinement
should be subject to the laws relating to the'administration of military justice
until discharged from such confinement. 3o Stat at L. 484. Thle second article
of war, as contained in the Act of June 3, 1916, subjected to the articles of war
"all persons under sentence adjudged by courts-martial." 39 Stat. at L. 2o8.
Colonel Winthrop, the leading American authority upon military law, was of
the op'inion that such enactments could not be constitutionally construed to
apply *to offenses committed by soldiers whose sentences to dishonorable dis-
charge had been executed. He qrgued that such soldiers had ceased to be part
of the land ,or naval forces and were therefore within the protection of the
Fifth Amendment. i Winthrop, Military Law (ist ed. 1886) iio, 121-i29. His
argument did not find support either with the Attorney General or with the
federal District Courts. It was met by two answers: first, that the military
prison is a part of the military establishment and subject to military jurisdic-
tion, so that an offense committed therein is a case arising in the land forces;
secofid, that the statute necessarily limits the power of a court-martial to sever
the connection of a convicted soldier with the army. Notwithstanding the
execution of the sentence, he still retains his military status. Ex parte Wild-
man (1876, D. C. D. Kans.) Fed. Cas. I7653a; In re Craig (895, C. C. D. Kans.)
7o Fed. 969; 16 Op. Atty. Gen. 29. The Supreme Court, in a dictum, had
assumed the constitutionality of the provision -as applied to military prisoners.
Carter v. McClaughry (1902) 183 U. S. 365, 383, 22 Sup. Ct. I8I, 188. In the
instant case it summarily dismisses the claim of unconstitutionality by referring
to the above cases, saying that "the principles upon which they rest adequately
demonstrate the unsubstantial character of the contention." As to the conten-
tion that the trial occurred "in time of peace," the court held that the phrase did
not contemplate 'a mere cessation of hostilities, but peace in the complete sense,
officially proclaimed." See Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co. (I919) 251
U. S. 146, 40 Sup. Ct. io6; (i919) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 113.
EQUITY-CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS-EFFECT OF THE MAXIM OF "CLEAN
HANDS" ON INFANT's RIGHT TO RELIEF.-The plaintiff, a moving picture actress
domiciled in California, entered into contracts in New York with the defendants,
New York corporations, for services to be performed in New York and Cali-
fornia. Under the law of New York she was an infant but under the law of
California she was of age. Before the expiration' of these contracts she repre-
sented to the Keeney Corporation that she was free to accept employment and
contracted with it for her exclusive services. The defendants refused to
release her and notified the Keeney Corporation of their 'claim. The plaintiff
filed a bill to have the original contract cancelled and to enjoin the defendants
from interfering with her employment by others. Held, that equity would not
give affirmative relief to one coming into court with unclean hands to "repudiate
her pledged word of honor," even though she were only morally bound. Car-
men v. Fox Film Corporation and William Fox Vaudeville Company. (Nov. lo,
192o) U. S. C. C. A. 2d, Oct. Term. 192o, No. 29.
It is well settled that equity will not aid one who has acted in bad faith or
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unfairly even if he has kept "within the law." Weeghman v. Killifer (1914, C.
C. A. 6th) 215 Fed. 289; Harton v. Little (1914) 188 Ala. 640, 65 So. 95z;
see I Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed. igi) sec..39
8
. Here this principle
comes into sharp conflict with the absolute power of an infant to disaffirm 
his
.contract. Whether this power will have to be modified to meet existing business
conditions, especially in the "movie" industry, where youth plays so large a 
part,
is an important question of policy for the courts. An entering wedge 
has
already been driven. In New York an injunction has been granted to restrain
an infant from violating his contract not to use his employer's list of customers
for a period after lbe left his employ. Mutual Milk and Cream Co. v. Prigge
(I9o6) xi2 App. Div. 652, 98 N. Y. Supp. 458; see NoTES (I9o6) 20 HARv. L. REv.
64. A recovery of premiums on an insurance policy.imade during infancy and
later disaffirmed has also been denied. Link v. N. Y. Life Insurance Co. (i9o9)
io7 Minn. 33, rig N. W. 488; contra, Simpson v. Prudential Ins. Co. (19o3)
184 Mass. 348, 68 N. E. 673. To prevent the use of .equity to aid in "contract
jumping" would seem to be the next logical step.
EQUITY-SPEcIFIC PERFORMANCE-INDEMNITY FOR DowER INTEREsT.-The defen-
dants were partners in real estate operations. They contracted to sell land to
the plaintiff, but finding that the property was increasing in value, they refused
to perform, giving as an excuse that the wife of one of them refused to release
her dower interest. The plaintiff brought this bill for specific performance.
Held,. that the plaintiff Was entitled to a decree for performance with indemnity
for the dower interest, since the wife collusively refused to join in the convey-
ance. Schefrin v. Wilensky (i92O, N. J. Ch.) III Atl. 66o.
In general, where a vendor has contracted to convey a larger estate than he
has, the vendee is entitled to specific performance of the contract with an
abatement in the purchase price for that part of or interest in the property
which the vendor is unable to convey. 'See Mortlock v. Buller (1804, Ch.) io
Ves. 292, 316; see Noxs (I912) 25 HAxv. L. R-v. 731; 2 Pomeroy, Equitable
Remedies (Ist ed. 19o5) sec. 831. An exception in some jurisdictions is where
the outstanding interest is dower. 2 Pomeroy, op. cit., sec. 834; see 36 Cyc. 745.
Two main reasons are given for this exception. In the first place a decree for
specific performance in such a case tends indirectly to exert pressure on the wife
and upset domestic relations. Haden v. Falls (1914) 115 Va. 779, 8o S. E. 576.
But this -reason does not apply where there is collusion between husband and
wife, as in the instant case, or misrepresentation on the part of the wife, since
the wife no longer is an innocent party in the matter. Stein v. Francis (ig9
N. J. Ch.) iog Atl. 737. Secondly, the difficulty of computing the value of the
inchoate dower because of the contingencies thereof, has been held to be so
great that a fair abatement or indemnity cannot be determined. Long v. Chand-
ler (1914) io Del. Ch. 339, 92 At. 256. Where the dower is consummate the
difficulty is less, and a court has granted an abatement in such a case where
it might not have done so had the dower been inchoate. Bostwick zo. Beach
(i886) 1o3 N. Y. 414, 9 N. E. 41; Roos v. Lockwood (i89I, Sup. Ct) 59 Hun.
18I, 13 N. Y. Supp. 128; but see Compione v. Eckert (192o, Sup. Ct.) iio Misc.
7o3, 182 N. Y. Supp. 137. The difficulty of calculation depends to a great extent
on the dower statutes of the jurisdiction. Therefore no general rule based on
this argument is possible. An abatement may be unfair, as the dower may never
vest. But an indemnity which returns to the vendor if the dower does not vest
has been held to work no great hardship on the vendor. Minge v. Green (1912)
176 Ala. 343, 58 So. 38r. Although it may be to the disadvantage of the purchaser
and against public policy by rendering the land unmarketable. Minge i. Green
(1912) 176 Ala. 343, 365, 58 So. 381, 388. Many courts have held that neither
reason is sufficient to take such a case out of the general rule. Bethell v. McKin-
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ney (1913) 164 N. C. 71, 8o-S. E. 162; Tebeau v. Ridge (1914) 26i Mo. 547,
17O S. W. 871. As the court in the instant case found that there was collusion,
the decision seems sound both on authority and reason. See L. R. A. 1917 F,
579, note.
EVIDENCE-COMPARISON OF HANDWRITING-ADMISSION OF SPECIMENS CONCEDED
TO BE GENUINE FOR PUPosEs OF CoMPAmsoN.-The plaintiff, a depositor with
the defendant bank, recovered in an action for a sum of money which he alleged
that the bank had paid out and charged to his account upon forged checks.
The bank brought this appeal, alleging as error the admission in evidence of
checks conceded to bear the genuine signature, of the plaintiff. Held, that a
paper not already in evidence, and having no connection with the issue to be
tried, could not be admitted either for the purpose of comparison by the jury
or to test the general accuracy of witnesses on cross-examination. Texas
State Bank v. Scott (192o, Tex.) 225 S. W. 571.
In nearly all jurisdictions comparison by the jury of the disputed handwriting
with specimens properly before them is allowed. There is, however, some
conflict and confusion as to the method of getting specimens before the jury.
Many jurisdictions admit for the purpose of comparison by the jury, writings
irrelevant to the issue and in no way in the case upon proof to the satisfaction
of the court of their genuineness. Homer v. Wallis (1814) II Mass. 3o8; 62
L. R. A.-866, note. Other jurisdictions admit specimens conceded to be genuine.
Cochrane v. National Elevator Co. (igio) 20 N. D. I6, I27 N. W. 725; Seaman
v. Husband (1917) 256 Pa. 571, zoo At. 941. Some courts admit no writings
solely for comparison, but allow comparison by the jury of writings already in
evidence. Mississippi Lumber & Coal Co. v. Kelly (i9o5) ig S. D. 577, CI4
N. W. 265, 9 Ann. Cas. 449, note. Other jurisdictions limit comparison to
specimens already in evidence and admitted to be genuine. Barnes v. United
States (igog, C. C. A. 5th) 166 Fed. 113. The objections advanced against the
admission of signatures for comparison are that there may be an unfair selec-
tion of specimens, and also that there may arise a confusion of issues. The
first objection is completely met by the rule limiting comparison to specimens
admittedly genuine, and also by the rule requiring the specimens to be already
in evidence and admitted to be genuine. This objection is of slight weight at
best, for in every action the party producing the evidence selects such evidence
as will be favorable to himself. See 3 Wigmore, Evidence (19o4) sec. iggg.
The second objection is obviously taken care of under any of the rules except
the one allowing comparison only with those writings already in evidence, but
even here it is of comparatively little weight. See Wigmore, op. cit., sec. 200o.
It see'ms, therefore, that since a writing admittedly genuine obviates the above
mentioned objections, it should be admitted for comparison. A writing conceded
or proved to be genuine, though otherwise irrelevant to the cause, may be
admitted to test the accuracy of a handwriting witness. McArthur v. Citizens
Bank- of Norfolk (1915, C. C. A. 4th) 223 Fed. ioo4; Ann. Cas. 1917 B, io67,
note. But when the testing signature is one whose genuineness is not admitted
or must be specially proved, because it is not otherwise in the case, the objec-
tions of multiplicity of issues and of unfairness of selection again arise. Owing
to the dangerous nature of expert handwriting testimony and the necessity of
testing it thoroughly to prevent injustice, the deprivation of this weapon for the
cross-examiner is a loss so serious as to outweigh the inconveniences of its
sanction. See Wigmore, op. cit., sec. 2D15.
EVIDENE-REAsONABLE DOUBT-CHAIN AND CABLE TnEoasxs-The defendant
was convicted of statutory rape and brought this appeal, assigning as error
the charge of the lower court that the corroborative evidence produced by the
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state must be established by a fair preponderance of the evidence, but.that the
jury must be satisfied of the sufficiency of the whole evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt. Held, that this instruction was erroneous, since corroborative evidence,
being a vital supplement to the body of the case, must :be established separately
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Smith (I920, Iowa) i8o N. W. 4.
The instant case illustrates the difficulties of the courts on the question whether
the jury must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to every essential fact
to be established by the state or as to the evidence as a whole only. I6 C. J. 765.
Two theories have been advanced, the "chain" theory and the "cable" theory.
See 2 Thompson, Trials (2d ed. 1912) secs. 25I2-2515. The adherents of the
chain theory have found great difficulty in reaching a uniform conclusion.
Some courts hold that each link in the chain of evidence connecting the accused
with the crime, must be proved individually beyond a reasonable doubt. Com-
morwealth v. Webster (i85o, Mass.) 5 Cush. 295; People z. Carson (I9o9) 155
Calif. 164, 99 Pac. 97o. Others hold that the theory applies only where each
link depends on the strength of the preceding one. State v. Young (19oo) 9
N. D. 165, 82 N. W. 42o; State zi. Shines (1899) 125 N. C. 730, 34 S. E. 552.
Still others hold that though each individual link must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, yet the facts which make up each link require only a fair
preponderance of the evidence. State v. Pack (192o) io6 Kan. 188, 186 Pac.
742; State v. Gallivan (1902) 75 Conn. 326, 53 Atl. 731. The followers of the
cable theory hold that the jury should be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt
from the evidence as a whole, for the incriminating facts are likened to the
strands of a cable, and though some of the strands break, if the cable is still
strong enough, the accused should be convicted. Pitts v. State (i9o4) i4o Ala.
70, 37 So. IOI; Carr . State (19o7) 8i Ark. 589, 99 S. W. 831. In the state
in which the instant case was decided, there has been an unusual amount of
litigation on this particular point, but the court seems finally to have adopted an
intermediate rule, viz: when the proof of the particular crime depends on
circumstantial evidence, then the chain theory is applied; otherwise the cable
theory governs. State v. Cohen (1899) io8 Iowa, 208, 78 N. W. 857; State v.
Hossack (i9o2) 1I6 Iowa, 194, 8g N. W. 1O77. It is submitted that though the
chain theory has many adherents, it is not the logical rule, for it makes each
circumstance stand by itself, unable to gain strength from the other circumstances
of the case. See 41 L. R A. (N. s.) 749, note. Also the greater the number of
circumstances essential to the crime, the harder it is to convict, for a long
chain is weaker than a short one. It is not. without reason that Wigmore says,
"and herein is given opportunity for much vain argument . . ." See 4 Wig-
more, Evidence (1905) sec. 2497.
FUTURE ITERESTS--DEvISE- To SoiE HER-AT-LAW OF LIM ESTATE WITH CON-
TINGENT REMAINDER BUT No LIMITTrIoNs OVER-PowER OF TESTAMENTARy
DisposrrioN.-The plaintiff, administrator of the estate of Anna Haley, brought
this suit against the latter's executors to recover for collateral heirs, the only
remaining next of kin, the share of the estate left to her by her father, in trust
for her benefit during life, and upon her death to her issue. The father's will
did not provide for disposition of the property in case Anna left no issue. Anna
died without issue, leaving a will, purporting to dispose absolutely of a portion
of the trust estate left her by her father's will. The plaintiff claimed that
the will was not effective to pass the property but that it became intestate pro-
perty upon Anna's death, and as such went to the testator's next of kin deter-
mined as of the time of Anna's death. Held, that the corpus of the trust estate
vested in Anna as of the time of her father's death, subject to the contingent limi-
tation to her issue, and her will disposing thereof was effective. Velders v. Gaines
(1920, Sup. Ct.) 112 Misc. 226, 184 N. Y. Supp. io.
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The court in the instant case seems to be of opinion that the above holding
is in opposition to a decision on the same point in the Simonson Case. Simonson
v. Waller (1896) 9 App. Div. 503, 41 N. Y. Supp. 662. It is not difficult to
reconcile these two cases, however, as the court in the latter case, after deciding
that the reversionary fee simple went back as intestate property to the heirs of the
testator, as of the date of his death, left the question of the validity of the
testamentary disposition by the life tenant, who was the only heir-at-law, to be
determined by the English courts. Where the testator devises an estate for life
with a contingent remainder and no limitation over, in case the remainder fails,
the property reverts to the heirs as intestate property. Heck v. Burgen (192o,
Pa.) I1I AtL 16o; see Schmidt v. Schmidt (1920, Ill.) 126 N. E. 736, 739; 40 Cyc.
195 b. Where the original )devise is ineffective on account of illegality or other
reasons, it has been held that the property goes back as intestate property to the
next of kin of the testator or to the residuary legatee, if any. In Ie
Billing's Estate (i920, Pa.) io Atl. 768; In re,Kelsey's Estate (1920, Surro.)
184 N. Y. Supp. 67. Both the American and English courts have decided that
the fact that a life tenant is also one of the next of kin does not prevent him
from sharing in the intestate property or in a residuary devise. Doane vr.
Mercantile Trust Co. (1899) i6o N. Y. 494, 55 N. E. 296; Wharton v. Barker
(i858, Ch.) 4 Kay & 3. 483; Bullock v. Downes (i86o) 9 H. L. Cas. I. It may
be noted that if there be an absolute gift of specific property, and later in the
same instrument a limitation of that property to the devisee for life, followed
by a contingent remainder for the devisee's children, the original gift remains
absolute where the limitation fails by reason of the fact that no children survive.
See Simonson v. Wailer (896) 9 App. Div. 503, 510, 41 N. Y. Supp. 662, 667;
Lassence v. Tierney (1849, CI.) I McN. & G. 551; see In re Merceron's Trusts
(1876) L. P. 4 Ch. Div. 182, 188. It is practically settled that where a contingent
remainder is created by a will, and the fee is not otherwise disposed of until the
happezing of the contingency, such fee descends in the meantime to the testator's
heirs, and when the contingency happens it opens to let in the remainder. Collins
v. Whitman (1920, Mo.) 2= S. W. 84o; see Matthews v. Andrews (1919, Ill.)
124 N. E. 871, 872; I Fearne, Contingent Remainders (ioth ed. 1844) 343. The
conclusion reached by the court in the instant case is in accord with sound
principle and upheld by both American and English authorities.
INTERNATIONAL LAW-REQUISITIoNED SHIPS IMMUNE FROM PROCESS-AMICI
CuRiAE.-A suit in rem was brought against the Gleneden, a British ship privately
owned. After process was issued and the vessel arrested, private counsel for
the Biitish embassy appeared as amici curiae and presented to the court a
suggestion that jurisdiction be declined and the process quashed, as the Gleneden
was an Admiralty transport, requisitioned by the British government. This
suggestion was overruled. The master of the ship petitioned for a writ of
prohibition preventing the District Court from proceeding with the suit, and for
a writ of mandamus ordering the release of the ship without security. Held,
that the petition should be dismissed, the suggestion by amici curiae not being
the proper procedure to bring the fact of requisition before the court. In re
Muir (1921, U. S.) 41 Sup. Ct. 185.
The court ruled that such facts could be laid before it in either of two ways.
The British government could appear as a party to the suit. The. Santissima
Trinidad (822, U. S.) 7 Wheat. 283, 353; Colombia v. Cauca Co. (I9O2) 190
U. S. 524, 23 Sup. Ct. 704. If unwilling to become a party, it was open to that
government to apply to the State Department to ask the Department of Justice
to cause the desired representations to be made. The Exchange (1812, U. S.)
7 Cranch, 116; 'The Parlement Belge (i8go, C. A.) L. R. 5 P. D. 197. In the
past the Supreme Court has permitted amici curiae to present suggestions, the
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reception of them being purely within the discretion of the court. Northern
Securities Co. v. United States (1903) 191 U. S. 555, 24 Sup. Ct. 1g; Dillon v.
Streathearn Steainihip Co. (1gig) 250 U. S. 638, 39 Sup. Ct. 495. The lower
federal courts have consistently followed this practiqe in cases involving ships
requisitioned by a foreign government. The Roseric (1918, D. N. J.) 254 Fed.
154; Earn Line Stea ship Co. v. Sutherland Co. (i92o, C. C. A. 2d) :64 Fed.
276; but see The Florence H. (igi, S. D. N. Y.) 248 Fed. 1oi2. The method
would seem to be the most expeditious one, and there is little likelihood of its
abuse. In the instant case the court refrained from deciding whether the
Gleneden was subject to a civil suit in rein in the federal courts. The lower
federal courts, as well as the English courts, have generally held that such a
suit could not be brought against a ship requisitioned by a foreign government.
The Adriatic (igig, C. C. A. 3d) 258 Fed. 9o2; The Broadmayne [ig16, C. A.]
P. 64; cohtra, The Attualita (1916, C. C. A. 4th) z38 Fed. 9o9. The ship may
be immune from arrest and yet the owners may be liable for negligence in a
suit in personam. The real foundation for the immunity of foreign public ships
rests on courtesy and a recognition of the complete sovereignty of the foreign
state, and it may well be as discourteous and embarrassing to a foreign nation to
arrest a ship which it does not own but merely controls, as to hold a ship to
which it has full title. With the growth of government ownership and opera-
tion throughout the world this problem is constantly becoming more pressing.
PERsoNs-AIENATIoN OF AFFECTIONS-AcTIoN AGAINST PARENTS OF HUSBAND
uxn A m OF LaaA. CONsENT.-The defendants brought an action to annul
the marriage of their son, because he had not attained the age of legal consent.
Pending the annulment action, they made false representations concerning the
plaintiff, their son's wife, which caused him to leave her. The plaintiff sued for
alienation of his affections. The marriage was subsequently annulled. Held,
that the action for alienation of affections would not lie. Putnam, J., dissenting.
Wolf v. Wolf (1920) 194 App. Div. 33, 185 N. Y. Supp. 37.
New York, in accord with the weight of modem authority, allows the wife
to recover for alienation of her husband's affections. Bennett v. Bennett (z889)
116 N. Y. 584, 23 N. E. 17; Code Civ. Proc. sec. 45o. And the action lies against
the parents of either spouse, if they acted from improper motives. 13 R. C. L.
I471. A parent is privileged to advise his son to leave his wife, provided he acts
in good faith and reasonably believes that it is for the son's good. Wilson v.
Wilson (1916) 115 Me. 341, 98 At. 938; Bourne v. Bourne (igig, Calif. App.)
185 Pac. 489. But a parent is not privileged to do so if he acts because of ill
will toward the wife. Lanigan v. Lanigan (1915) 222 Mass. 198, 11o N. E. 285;
Melcher v. Melcher (1918) io2 Neb. 790, 169 N. W. 72o. The marriage, in the
instant case, was void, not ab initio, but only from the time its nullity was decreed
by the court. Domestic Relations Law (Consol. Laws, ch. 4) sec. 7; Houle v.
Houle (1917) ioo Misc. 28, 166 N. Y. Supp. 67. And 'it would therefore seem
to be a valid marriage for all civil purposes until the decree of nullity. State v.
Lowell (1899) 78 Minn. i66, 8o N. W. 877. The majority opinion, however,
holds the quo animo of the parent immaterial, where the child was under the age
of legal consent. The view of the dissenting opinion is that false representations
concerning the wife are never privileged and that parental interference is
privileged only when it comes within the above rule. The dissenting opinion
seems to advance the sounder view.
QUASI.-CONTRACrS-CNTRIBJ£IoN BETWEEN JOINT ToRT-FEAsoRs.-The plain-
tiff was driving his car along a highway at a lawful rate of speed and using due
care. The defendant, approaching from a side street, negligently drove his
motor truck across the highway directly in front of the plaintiff's car. To
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avoid a collision the plaintiff turned 'his car to one side, and in so doing ran up
on the side walk and struck a pedestrian. The pedestrian sued the plaintiff and
recovered. The plaintiff brought this action to recover indemnity from the
defendant. Held, that the plaintiff could recover only if at the time of the
accident he was not actively negligent, and the defendant alone could have
prevented it by using ordinary care. Knippenberg v. Lord & Taylor' (i92o)
193 App. Div. 753, 184 N. Y. Supp. 785.
In Missouri contribution between joint tort-feasors is allowed by statute.
See Rev. St. Mo. 1909, sec. 5431; Eaton v. Miss. Valley Trust Co. (i9o6)
123 Mo. App. 117, 100 S. W. 551. It is usually stated, however, as axiomatic
that contribution will not be allowed.. Merryweather v. Nixan (1799, K. B.) 8
T. R. x86; Union Stockyards Co. v. Chicago B. & Q. Ry. (19o4) 196 U. S. 217,
25 Sup. Ct. --&6. However, since the tinie this so-called general rule was first
announced, the courts have engrafted several exceptions: (i) Where the
liability of the plaintiff who seeks contribution was merely a result of his rela-
tion to.,the defendant, as of master to servant. Wooley v. Batte (1826, N. P.)
2 Car. & P. 417; Bailey v. Bussing (i859) 28 Conn. 455. (2) Where the defen-
dant against whom contribution is sought was under a so-called primary duty to
prevent the injury, as where a lessor has covenanted to repair. Prescott v.
Le Conte (I9o3) 83 App. Div. 48, 82 N: Y. Supp. 411; Pullman Co. v. Hoyle
(1908) 52 Tex. Civ. App. 534, 11 S. W. 315. (3) Where, as said in the instant
case, the defendant alone was actively negligent or could halve prevented the
injury by using ordinary care. Township v. Noret (I916) 191 Mich. 427, 158
N. W. 17; Nashua Iron Co. v. Worcester Ry. (I882) 62 N. H. 159. (4) Where
the joint wrong was not conscious or wilful, but merely negligent. There seems
to be a strong tendency toward the adoption of this'rule, although the cases so
holding are still in the minority. Mayberry v. Northern Pac. Ry. (r907) 100
Minn. 79, iio N. W. 356; Hobbs v. Hurley (i918) 117 Me. 449, i04 AtI. 815.
It has been even argued that this always was the law. See T. R. Reath, Contri-
bution Between Persons Jointly Charged for Negligence (x898) 12 HARV. L. Rar.
176 if. It is submitted that the court in the instant case should have reached
the same decision by adopting this view instead of seeking justice for the plaintiff
under the doctrine of last clear chance. See Bohlen, Contributory Negligence
(i908) 21 HARv. L. Rav. 233, 242.
SALES-WARRANTY OF Trr-WnRE SALE Bi VENDEE wouLD BE INFRINGE-
mENT OF TRADE MmK.-The plaintiffs purchased for cash from the defendants
one thousand cans of "Nissly" brand milk. The Nestl6 company subsequently
having established their right to the trade mark against other parties, the plaintiffs
sold 'the milk without the labels and consequently at a lower price. They now
sued the defendants for the purchase price, or alternatively, for damages. Held,
that there was no right of recovery. Niblett v. The Confectioners' Materials
Co. (192o, K. B.)- 37 T. L.. R. 103.
This case was decided on the basls of the analogy to a case where the
goods constituted an infringement of a patent In the patent cases in this
country, one case has denied the existence, of a warranty of title. Lowman v.
E.icelsior Stove Co. (1894) io4 Ala. 367, x6 So. i7. Some have assumed the
existence of such a warranty, whereas others have expressly affirmed it. 'The
Electron (1896, C. C. A. 2d) 74 Fed. 689; Uniform Sales Act, sec. 13 (3).
Assuming a warranty of title, the next question is whether a breach has occurred.
Where- the owner of a patent has threatened suit, there is no breach unless the
owner has been shown clearly to have the right Geist v. Stier (i89o) z34 Pa.
216, I9 AtI. 5o5. Nor is mere notice of infringement a breach. Consolidated
Phosphate v. Sturtevant (1917) 2o Ga. App. 474, 93 S. E. I55. Nor the filing
of a claim for damages where the patent has been upheld by a court in a
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proceeding against other parties. Consumer's Gas Co. v. Am. Electric Co. 
(I892,
C. C. A. 3d) 5o Fed. 778. But there is a breach where an injunction against the
use of the purchased article has been secured. The Electron, supra. 
The
nature of the goods in the instant case was such that they were intended 
to be
sold rather than kept for use. The privilege of selling these goods 
with the
labels was as truly a part of the title intended to be conferred upon the 
plaintiff
as was the right of possession. Where the right of possession has, been 
ques-
tioned, the purchaser may voluntarily surrender on demand of the true owner
and claim damages for breach o.f warranty. Jordans v. Van Duzee (1917) 139
Minn. IO3, 165 N. W. 877. Similarly, it is submitted, the purchaser should be
allowed voluntarily to sell without the labels and bring an action for breach 
of
warranty.
SURETYSHIP-CRIMINAL BAIL BOND-CONTINUANcE PENDING TRIAL DoEs 
Nor
RELEASE SuPmwry.-The defendant was surety on a criminal bail bond for one
Cooper, who had been indicted by a grand jury. Cooper appeared at the next
term of court and the case was continued by agreement of the attorneys. When
subsequently the case was called, Cooper did not appear and this action
was brought against the surety to recover on the bond. Held, that the contin-
uance of a criminal cause, pending trial, does not release a surety on the bail bond.
State v. Cooper (192o, Minn.) i8o N. W. 99.
It is a general rule that a binding agreement made by the creditor to extend the
time of the principal discharges the surety. Kissire v. Plunkett-Jarrell Co.
(r912) 1O3 Ark. 473, 145 S. W. 567. The reason underlying this is that such
an extension of time is prejudicial to the surety, since it increases his risk.
This rule, however, does not apply here because of the difference between the
ordinary surety and a criminal bail. The ordinary surety is under no duty
prior to the default by the principal, and payment by him discharges the obliga-
tion of the principal to the creditor. The surety on a criminal bail bond is
under a duty to secure the appearance of his principal before the court for the
purposes of justice, and payment by the surety does not discharge the obligation
of the accused to appear in court. The latter surety is an officer of the court
who guards the accused in lieu of the jailor. Suggs v,. State (1914) 129 Tenn.
498, 167 S. W. 122. There is a conflict as to whether a coatinuance of the cause
discharges the surety. The courts which, in accord with the instant case,
regard the ordinary criminal bail bond as one continuing until the case is
finally disposed of, hold that a continuance does not discharge the surety upon the
theory that the duty as policeman does not cease until the accused is either
finally convicted or acquitted. "St. Louis v. Young (igiI) 235 Mo. 44, 138 S. W.
5; State vt. Williams (199o) 84 S. C. 21, 65 S. E. 982. Following this theory
it was held that a bail bond remained effective after a mistrial was ordered.
State z. Eure (i916) 172 N. C. 874, 89 S. E. 788. Other courts construe the
bond as meaning that the obligation of the surety is oniy to have the accused
appear on the first day of a certain term and be in attendance until the end of
said term, unless sooner discharged, and at the end of this term the surety is
released. The theory here is that the. accused should be remanded to jail at the
end of the term or a new bond executed. Lane v. State (1897) 6 Kan. App.
1o6, 50 Pac. 9o5; State v. Murdock (190) 59 Neb. 521, 81 N. W. 447. It seems
that on the grounds of convenience and expediency the former view is to be
preferred.
TAXATION-FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-WHAT CONSTrrUTES "DOING BUSINES.'--
The New York Tax Commission, the defendants, imposed upon the plaintiff, a
foreign corporation, a license fee and a franchise tax under the Tax Law, secs.
181, 182, (N. Y. Consol. Laws 199, c. 60) based on business done during i916.
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The plaintiff had no property in the state other than bonds and notes deposited
with a trust company, and confined its operations to the collection and distri-
bution to its stockholders of income from stock and the obligations of other
foreign corporations. Held, that the tax was not collectable, since the corpora-
tion's activities did not constitute either "doing business" or "employing capital"
in the state. People ex rel. Manila Electric Ry. & Lighting Corporation v.
Knapp (i92O) 29 N. Y. 502, x28 N. E. 892.
What constitutes "doing business" for tax purposes seems not susceptible of
any general definition that is not so general as to be of no practical use. The
present decision holds that "doing business" implies that the foreign corporation's
activities are of a kind which the state might prevent, the doing of which,
therefore, is a privilege requiring governmental control and protection for
which taxation is compensation. The federal test is whether the corporation
is active and is maintaining its organization for the purpose of continued efforts
in the pursuit of profit and gain, and such activities as are essential to those
purposes. Von Baumbach v. Sargent Land Co. (1916) 242 U. S. 503, 37 Sup. Ct.
2o. The changing circumstances incident to an almost endless amount of liti-
gation on the subject have created a vast number of subsidiary rules, varying
according to the character of the applicable statutes and their interpretation by
the courts. See Haring, Corporate Interstate Commerce Business (917) 671,
appendix; (1916) 14 MicH. L. REv. 588. But the underlying question in each
case is whether the business implies corporate continuity of conduct, as might
be evidenced by any of the acts which some of the courts have seized upon as
criteria. Pa. Collieries Co. v. McKeever (i9o5) 183 N. Y 98, 75 N. E. 935.
See Beale, Foreign Corporations (I9O4) secs. 2oi-2io (classification of operative
acts and collection of cases). Continuity, however, would be immaterial if the
acts done were not "business" in themselves. Natural Carbon Paint Co. v.
Fred. Bredel Co. (i9xi, C. C. A. 7th) 193 Fed. 897 (mere holding of property).
The test applied in the instant case does not seem as satisfactory or useful as that
of continuity, which in the last analysis becomes a question of fact for the jury.
ToRTs-INjuRy AGGRA.VATED BY PHYSICIAN-SUBROGATION OF FiRST TORT-FEA-
SOR TO INJURED PERSON'S RIGHTS-PARTIES.-A fracture of the plaintiff's wrist,
caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant electric light company, was
treated so unskillfully by one Rumph, a physician, that the plaintiffs arm became
paralyzed. A statute provided that where a defendant would have a cause of
action over against a third person for the amount of the recovery against him,
on a contention closely related to the subject of the original action, the court,
in its discretion, might make such third person a party defendant. The company
in a cross complaint asked that Rumph be made a party defendant, and that it
recover of him such damages as were in excess of those which have fol-
lowed had the plaintiff's injury been treated with ordinary skill. Rumph
demurred to the cross complaint. Held, that the demurrer should be overruled,
and that the action of the court in bringing Rumph in as a party, could not be
reviewed on demurrer. Fisher v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co. (192O, Wis.)
i8o N. W. 269.
It is generally held that unskillful treatment of an injury does not break
the chain of legal causation so as to bar a recovery against the original tort-
feasor unless the injured party was negligent in selecting a physician. Fields v.
Mankato Elec. Traction Co. (IgI) II6 Minn. 218, 133 N. W. 577; Hunt v. Boston
Terminal Co. (1912) 212 Mass. 99, 98 N. E. 786; see 48 L. R. A. (N. s.) 116,
note. Ordinarily, any person liable for, and who has paid for a loss or injury
caused by another, is subrogated to the rights of the injured party against that
other person. Texas & P. Ry. v. Eastin (i9o7) ioo Tex. 556, io2 S. W. IO5;
Holmes v. Balcom (1892) 84 Me. 226, 24 Atl. 821. However, it has been said
that a wrongdoer cannot invoke the doctrine, and that the right is never granted
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as a reward for negligence. See Padgett v. Yioung County (I918, Tex. Civ. App.)
2o4 S. W. io46, 1054; Rowley v. Towsley (884) 53 Mich. 329, 339, 19 N, W. 2o,
25; Ft. Dodge Bldg. & Loan .Ass'n. v. Scott (1892) 86 Iowa, 431, 434, 53 N. W.
283, 284- But there would seem to be no public policy against permitting 
a
merely negligent defendant to invoke the doctrine as to a particular part 
of a
loss, for 'which he is very little at fault, against one in whose- favor there are 
no
equities, and who is greatly at fault. Cf. Texas & P. Ry. v. Eastin, supra;
see tit. QUAsI-CoNTRAcTS, supra In the absence of statute, subrogation is not
allowed to an employer who pays an employee workmen's compensation for an
injury due to a third person's fault, but this is on the theory that money so paid
is not compensation or indemnity for the injury.. See (I918) 27 Y m LAw
JOURNAL, 7O8; (i918) 18 Cor. L. Rav. 598. Without such a statute as in the
instant case, actual payment to the injured .party is necessary for subrogation.
Aetna Life Ins. Co. V. Middleport (1888) 124 U. S. 534, 8 Sup. Ct 625; Mus-
grave v. Dickinson (1896) 172 Pa. 629, 33 Atl. 7o5. Generally, a defendant can
only bind a party against whom he will have a remedy over, when he is compelled
to defend no misfeasance of his own, and has called on such other person to
defend the action against him. Lord & Taylor v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co.
(i92o) 230 N. Y. i32, 129 N. E..346; Consolidated Machine Co. v'. Bradley
(898) IS Mass. 127, 133, 5o N. E. 464, 467. Even -though the statute in the
instant case, by its own language, calls for a liberal construction "in order that
as far as possible, closely related questions may be settled in one action," an
interpretation rendering the words, "for the amount of the recovery against
him," of no force, may be questioned. Even if we assume that the statute
did confer the power, it would seem that the exercise of the court's discretion
in bringing in such a party as the physician here, was unwise, because the plain-
tiff might lose the physician's co-operation in his professional capacity, since
under the circumstances he would try to keep down the amount of her recovery.
